Synopsis

I. Methods Of Interpretation

II. Basic Rules of Interpretation

1. Language of the statute to be read as it is

i.Substitution or addition of words to be avoided

ii. Addition when Permissible

iii. Avoiding rejection of words

iv. Rejection of words when permissible

v. Treating words or provisions as superfluous

vi. Casus omissus

“Casus omissus” cannot be supplied

I. Methods Of Interpretation

Interpretation can be either ‘legal’ or ‘doctrinal’. When there is a rule of law binding the judges to place a certain interpretation on the statute , it is said to be ‘legal’. When the purpose of interpretation is to bring out the real or true meaning of statute, it is said to be ‘doctrinal’.

Doctrinal interpretation is further divided into two categories i.e, ‘grammatical’ or ‘logical’. When general laws of speech are applied it is said to be ‘grammatical’. When the intention of the statute is discovered in some other way it is said to be 'logical'.

Legal Interpretation is further divided into two categories, i.e. 'authentic' and 'usual'. When the interpretation is based on the legislator himself, it is called authentic; when the interpretation is from any other source such as custom or case law, it is usual.

II. Basic Rules of Interpretation

1. Language of the statute to be read as it is

The intention of the legislature is to be found from the language of statute i.e, from what has been said and from what has not been said. [V Jagganndha Rao Vs. State of A.P. (2001)].

Thus to bring out the intention, in some cases, some words may be added or rejected.
A construction should be avoided if it requires addition or substitution of words, or rejects words as meaningless.

Supreme Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. CCT (2010)

It is a well settled principle in law that the court cannot add anything into a statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous. Language employed in a statute itself determines and indicates the legislative intent. If the language is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the court to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent not found in the statute.

i.Substitution or addition of words to be avoided

Only in case of compelling reasons , a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislation will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. In same way new words cannot be accepted.

V Jaggannadha Rao V. State of A.P. (2001)

But due to unskillfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language, then in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective.

ii. Addition when Permissible

In the foll cases addition is permissible:

1) Surjet Singh Kalra Vs UOL(1991)

“...where the atternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted or adopting a strict construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, its is permissible to supply the words”;
2) AIR 1959 SC 198 : To avoid any part of the statute becoming meaningless;
3) To inculcate the legislative intent which is apparent from the Act read as a whole;
4) To inculcate the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve.

[ Great offshore Ltd . V. Iranian Offshore Engg. and Const. Co., (2001)]

Before the court adds, omits or substitutes words, it has to make sure of the following matters:

1) Intended purpose of the statute or provision.

2) Effect of the purpose not given by inadvertence of the draftsman and Parliament.

3) Had the error been noticed, the substance of the provision that would have been made by Parliament.

Siraj-ul-Haq V. Sunni Central Board of Wakf. (1959)

In this case, the words, “any person interested in a Wakf ” were interpreted as “any person interested in what is held to be a Wakf ”.It was held that, where literal meaning of words used in a statute openly defeats its object, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provisions.

iii. Avoiding rejection of words

Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (1952)

In this case it was stated that, it is not sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.

Grasim Industries Ltd. V. Collector of Customs, (2002)

In this case it was held that, where the words are clear and there is no obscurity or ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provision.

iv. Rejection of words when permissible

The draftsman’s unskilfulness could result in ineffectiveness of the statute, while the intention of the legislature may be clear. Courts by their interpretative skill bring out the true meaning of the statute.

v. Treating words or provisions as superfluous

Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd ,(1962)

In this case it was held that, when the provision of an Act gives out an irrefutable impression that it owes its existence or origin to a confusion of ideas, or to a misunderstanding of the law, or to abundant caution, or to allay fears, the court declares the provision to be superfluous.

vi. Casus omissus

The two main principles of construction

1) Casus omissus, and

2) Reading the statute of a whole.

According To Walker, casus omissus means, a case omitted from the language of the section, but within the general scope of the statute, and which appears to have been omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen.

Casus omissus can be supplied in case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in four corners of the statute itself.

Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar,(2003)

A casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose, all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together, and every clause of section should be construed with reference to the context and other clause thereof, so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a constituent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so, if the literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results, which could not have been intended by the legislature.

State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. M. Khan (1981)

In this case while construing Section 4(1), Kerala Agriculturists Debt Reliefs Act, 1970, the Supreme Court interpreted the words “ any debt due before the commencement of this Act to any banking company” as meaning “any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act.”

Southern Railway v. T.R Chellappan

The supreme court interpreted the words "any party to an arbitration agreement ” in section 33, of Arbitration Act, I940 to mean “ a person who is alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement”.

“Casus omissus” cannot be supplied

It is an important rule that casus omissus cannot be supplied by the courts .

Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun – Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., (1932-33)

A matter, which should have been provided in a statute, cannot be supplied by courts, because that would tantamount to legislation and not construction.

State of W.B v. Kesoram Industries Ltd

It was stated that, the ordinary rule of interpretation is that the words used by the legislature shall be given such meaning as the legislature has chosen to assign them by coining definitions contained in the interpretation clause and in the absence thereof, the words would be given such meaning as they are susceptible of in the ordinary parlance, may be, by having recourse to dictionaries.

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